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ABSTRACT: (183 words) 
Loss aversion is a central element of Prospect Theory, the dominant theory of decision-
making under uncertainty for the past four decades, and refers to the overweighting of 
potential losses relative to equivalent gains, a critical determinant of risky decision-making. 
Recent advances in affective and decision neuroscience have shed new light on the 
psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss aversion. Here, integrating 
across disparate literatures, from the level of neurotransmitters to subjective reports of 
emotion, we propose a novel neural and computational framework that links 
norepinephrine to loss aversion and identifies a distinct role for dopamine in risk taking for 
rewards. We also propose that loss aversion specifically relates to anticipated emotions 
and aspects of the immediate experience of realized gains and losses but not their long-
term emotional consequences, highlighting an underappreciated temporal structure. 
Finally, we discuss challenges to loss aversion and the relevance of loss aversion to 
understanding psychiatric disorders. Refining models of loss aversion will have broad 
consequences for the science of decision-making, and for how we understand individual 
variation in economic preferences and psychological well-being across both healthy and 
psychiatric populations.  
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Psychologists and economists have studied how we make decisions in the face of 
uncertainty for centuries. One particular framework, Prospect Theory, has dominated 
research on risky decision-making since its introduction almost four decades ago 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Arguably the single most influential piece of Prospect 
Theory is the idea that when making choices, people overweight losses relative to 
equivalently sized gains, a phenomenon called loss aversion introduced with the 
memorable phrase “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Loss 
aversion was computationally formalized as a multiplicative weight on losses relative to 
gains represented by the parameter l (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), and was separate 
from risk aversion (arising from curvature in the utility function) represented by the 
parameter r: 
Eq. 1  if x ≥ 0 u(x) = xr 
Eq. 2  if x < 0 u(x) = -l*(-x)r 
 
Figure 1 - An example Prospect Theory utility function with a loss aversion coefficient l of 2 and risk aversion parameter 
r of 0.8 captures the relationship between subjective and objective values. The loss aversion coefficient here of 2 
means that losses carry exactly twice the weight of equally sized gains in determining decisions; in this case, the utility 
of a loss of $5 is -7.2, twice the magnitude of the utility of an equally sized gain, +3.6. While the steepness of the slope 
in the loss versus the gain domain reflects a typical degree of loss aversion, curvature in the utility function captures 
common features of economic choice including risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses. This curvature means 
that $5 is worth more than a lottery with equal probabilities of receiving $10 or $0, even though the average return of 
the lottery and the sure $5 is the same. 
 
Loss aversion has been argued to be present in both risky (Gachter, Johnson, & 
Herrmann, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and riskless settings (Gachter et al., 2007; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Loss aversion is not normatively good or bad per se – for 
example, in a survival context, loss aversion may prevent starvation or death, but in an 
investment context, loss aversion can reduce earnings. In keeping with commonly 
accepted shorthand, hereafter we will use the phrase “loss averse behavior” to indicate 
decisions that are consistent with loss aversion as specified by Prospect Theory. 
 
WHO IS LOSS AVERSE AND FOR WHAT? 
Research on loss aversion has become considerably more common in recent years, 
establishing that loss averse behavior is nearly ubiquitous, appearing across different 
groups of people, types of choices, and even species. For example, professional traders 
(Haigh & List, 2005), taxi drivers (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, & Thaler, 1997), the 
young and elderly (Rutledge et al., 2016), and capuchin monkeys (Chen, 
Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006) exhibit loss averse behavior on average (see Table 
1). People are loss averse for money (e.g. Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan, 2015; 
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), goods (Bateman, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer, & Sugden, 
2005), and labor decisions (Camerer et al., 1997). Loss aversion is generally higher for 
larger stakes in singular (not repeated) choices, and is reduced but not eliminated by 
experience (Camerer et al., 1997; Haigh & List, 2005), and can vary with context such that 
in some environments (like a casino), individuals may have lower average levels of loss 
aversion than in other environments. Often overlooked is the fact that loss aversion varies 
considerably across individuals but is stable over time within individuals (Brown et al., 
2014; Rutledge et al., 2015), making it a reliable measure of individual differences in risky 
decision-making. Such variability also means that while the population may on average be 
loss averse (l > 1), a given individual may be gain-loss neutral (l = 1), or even gain-
seeking (l < 1). Importantly, recent studies have also begun to establish the affective and 
neural processes underlying loss aversion, with critical implications for understanding how 
and when it is observed, why healthy populations have so much variability, and how it is 
affected by psychiatric disorders. 
	 
TABLE	1:	A	SELECTION	OF	LOSS	AVERSION	FINDINGS	
	First	Author,	Journal,	and	
Year	of	Publication	 l Sample	
Main	loss	aversion	finding	(for	money	unless	stated	
otherwise)	
Putler;	Marketing	Science;	
1992	 2.5	
104	weeks	of	weekly		
retail	demand	for	eggs	
in	Southern	California	
People	are	loss	averse	about	price	changes	when	
purchasing	eggs.		
Pennings;	Management	
Science;	2003	 1.8	 332	farmers	
Farmers	exhibit	loss	aversion	when	purchasing	and	
selling	hogs.	
Bateman;	Journal	of	Public	
Economics;	2005	
1.2-
2.4	 427	young	adults	
People	perceive	giving	up	money	for	vouchers	that	can	
be	exchanged	for	chocolate	as	a	loss.		
Chen;	Journal	of	Political	
Economy;	2006	 2.7	 6	capuchin	monkeys	 Monkeys	exhibit	loss	aversion	for	fruit.	
Tom;	Science;	2007	 1.9	 16	young	adults	
Balance	of	striatal	activity	to	potential	losses	vs.	gains	
correlates	with	loss	aversion.	
Goldstein;	SSRN	Working	
Paper;	2008	 2.1	
141	adults	saving	for	
retirement	
People	exhibit	loss	aversion	in	retirement	fund	
allocations.	
Sokol-Hessner;	PNAS;	2009	 1.4	 30	young	adults	
Arousal	to	outcomes	correlates	with	loss	aversion;	
emotion	regulation	reduces	loss	aversion.	
De	Martino;	PNAS;	2010	
1.52-
1.76	 12	adults	
Loss	aversion	is	eliminated	in	two	patients	with	
amygdala	damage	compared	to	matched	controls.	
Bibby;	Personality	and	
Individual	DIfferences;	2011	 1.9	 260	young	adults	
Higher	levels	of	alexithymia	are	linked	to	reduced	loss	
aversion.		
Chib;	Neuron;	2012	 2.1	 32	young	adults	
Loss	aversion	accounts	for	the	effect	of	"choking	under	
pressure"	during	a	physical	skill	task.	
Sokol-Hessner;	SCAN;	2013	 1.6	 47	young	adults	
Amygdala	response	to	outcomes	correlates	with	loss	
aversion.	
Boyce;	Psychological	
Science;	2013	 2.5	
49,293	community	
participants	
The	populations	of	Germany	and	Great	Britain	exhibit	
loss	aversion	in	happiness	in	response	to	changes	in	
income.	
Chumbley;	Psychological	
Science;	2014	 1.9	 57	young	adult	males	
Chronic	levels	of	cortisol	assessed	from	hair	samples	
negatively	correlate	with	loss	aversion.	
Rutledge;	Journal	of	
Neuroscience;	2015	 1.3	 30	young	adults	
Loss	aversion	was	not	affected	by	the	administration	of	
levodopa,	which	boosts	dopamine.	
Sokol-Hessner;	Cognition	&	
Emotion;	2015	 1.4	 22	young	adults	
Interoceptive	accuracy	is	higher	in	people	with	greater	
loss	aversion.	
Sokol-Hessner;	
Psychological	Science;	2015	 1.5	 47	young	adults	
Propranolol,	which	blocks	noradrenergic	receptors,	
reduces	loss	aversion	for	some	individuals.	
Charpentier;	Biological	
Psychiatry;	2016	 2.0	
48	anxious	&	healthy	
adults	
Loss	aversion	is	no	different	in	individuals	meeting	
criteria	for	Generalized	Anxiety	Disorder.	
Lazzaro;	PLoS	ONE;	2016	
1.5-
1.8	 72	young	adults	
Women	are	equally	loss	averse	as	men,	except	during	
ovulation,	when	they	are	less	loss	averse.	
Rutledge;	Current	Biology;	
2016	 1.9	
25,189	community	
participants	
When	playing	for	points	on	a	smartphone	app,	loss	
aversion	did	not	change	with	age.	
Genauck;	Scientific	Reports;	
2017	 1.9	 51	adults	
Pathological	gambling	and	Alzheimer's	disease	are	
associated	with	reduced	loss	aversion	compared	to	
healthy	controls.	
 
LOSS AVERSION AND AFFECT 
The ubiquity of loss averse behavior, and the aforementioned variability in loss aversion 
simultaneously beg the question: what is the source of loss aversion? One compelling 
response comes from affective science with the suggestion that loss aversion has its roots 
(in both its ubiquity and variance) in asymmetric emotional responses to either potential or 
actual losses and gains. Psychophysiological research showed that arousal responses to 
loss and gain outcomes are correlated with the estimated degree of individual loss 
aversion, and emotion-regulation strategies reduced loss aversion and physiological 
responses to loss outcomes (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Further links to emotion have 
been established by studies reporting that people with high interoceptive ability have 
increased loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner, Hartley, Hamilton, & Phelps, 2015), while people 
with alexithymia, a disorder of affect perception, have reduced loss aversion (Bibby & 
Ferguson, 2011). Hormones, associated with more gradual changes in emotion, have also 
been linked to loss aversion in that both ovulation in females (Lazzaro, Rutledge, Burghart, 
& Glimcher, 2016) and elevated levels of the stress hormone cortisol have been linked to 
reduced loss aversion (Chumbley et al., 2014; but see Sokol-Hessner, Raio, Gottesman, 
Lackovic, & Phelps, 2016). 
Equally important to consider, however, are the aspects of affective experience to 
which loss aversion does not appear to be related. Individuals with Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder do not have increased loss aversion (although they do have increased risk 
aversion, a dissociation made possible by computational modeling) (Charpentier, Aylward, 
Roiser, & Robinson, 2016), and happiness after gain and loss outcomes is not related to 
loss aversion as expressed at the time of decision (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 
2006; Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014), although people do expect loss 
outcomes to have a greater emotional impact than equivalent gains (Kermer et al., 2006). 
Moment-to-moment happiness instead depends on the cumulative impact of recent 
outcomes relative to expectations about those outcomes (e.g., prediction errors), with no 
differential emphasis on losses compared to gains on average (Rutledge et al., 2014). 
Together, these findings suggest that asymmetric affective processing of gains and losses 
may be most strongly present during the anticipation of possible gains and losses and the 
immediate experience of gain and loss outcomes, with both types of emotional experience 
being associated with loss-averse choices. However, asymmetric gain/loss processing 
does not extend even a few seconds after outcomes occur, to longer-lasting emotional 
states like happiness. However, one study found that year-on-year losses in income 
decreased subjective well-being more than year-on-year gains in income increased 
subjective well-being (Boyce, Wood, Banks, Clark, & Brown, 2013). One possibility is that 
income losses disproportionately influence subjective well-being due not to the experience 
of the loss itself, but due to an increase in the number of negative events resulting from 
decreased income (e.g., difficulty paying for normal daily expenses that were previously 
affordable). In other words, if the experience of a loss is brief and does not have significant 
lasting consequences (perhaps because of its small size), then its impact may be rapidly 
diluted by time, but if a loss leads to an increased frequency of subsequent negative 
events (as could happen with a significant decrease in income), then its affective impact 
may also persist and lead to the observed asymmetric gain/loss response pattern similar to 
that expressed during decisions and consistent with loss aversion. If such asymmetric 
outcome processing is, in fact, at the root of the effect of income changes on happiness, 
then the magnitude of that effect for a given person should correlate with that person’s loss 
aversion as measured from their decisions.  
These recent findings suggest that loss aversion and subsequent gain/loss 
processing have an underappreciated temporal structure that is critical to determining 
when one would expect to observe loss averse behavior and disproportionate affective 
consequences for losses. Decisions between options with potential gains and losses 
reflect how an individual would emotionally experience those gains and losses, but given 
even small amounts of time or intervening events, affective responses rapidly equilibrate 
and diverge from decisions.  
 
THE NEURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF LOSS AVERSION 
Understanding why and how loss aversion and asymmetric gain/loss processing occur 
requires neuroscience. In turn, a greater understanding of the underlying neural 
mechanisms promises to aid the development of more accurate models of human 
behavior. Behavioral scientists that take the time to learn about the brain may benefit from 
understanding the physiological constraints that it places on behavior. Research on the 
neuroscientific basis of loss aversion has identified several critical neural components, 
suggesting a model of loss aversion in the human brain and providing links to the 
neuroscience of affect. While cortical structures including the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex have been implicated in representing the overall 
subjective value of stimuli (Clithero & Rangel, 2014), two subcortical targets have emerged 
as the most consistently related to loss aversion. Neuroimaging studies have consistently 
identified two regions whose activity at the time of decisions and the receipt of outcomes 
correlates with loss aversion: the striatum (Canessa et al., 2017; Canessa et al., 2013; 
Chib, De Martino, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2012; Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps, 2013; 
Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007) and the amygdala (Canessa et al., 2013; Charpentier, 
De Martino, Sim, Sharot, & Roiser, 2016; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). Studies in patients 
have provided corroborating evidence that damage to the amygdala eliminates loss 
aversion (De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010). 
  One of the major neuromodulatory inputs to the striatum is dopamine, which has 
long been linked to risk-taking behavior, but not loss aversion itself. Dopaminergic inputs to 
the striatum are known to represent the subjective value of rewarding options (Lak, 
Stauffer, & Schultz, 2014) but it is not known whether these subjective values reflect 
potential losses. One study administering a chemical precursor to dopamine, levodopa, 
during a risky decision-making task, found that while levodopa increased both reward 
seeking (i.e., gambling in trials with potential gains but not losses) and happiness after 
small rewards, levodopa did not affect loss aversion (Rutledge et al., 2015). Computational 
models identified this increase in reward seeking as changes in a value-independent 
Pavlovian ‘approach’ parameter. Another study where participants chose between safe 
and risky options that featured only potential gains also found an overall increase in risk 
taking for rewards after levodopa administration (Rigoli et al., 2016). Dopamine has been 
linked to happiness resulting from rewards, and a link between happiness and recent 
‘good’ news is consistent with a large literature on dopaminergic systems representing 
deviations from expectations (e.g. prediction errors; Rutledge et al., 2014). Healthy aging, 
during which there is a substantial decline in the dopamine system, is also associated with 
a marked reduction in reward seeking, but no change in loss aversion (Rutledge et al., 
2016). These findings suggest that dopamine’s role in risk-taking may be most directly 
related to reward seeking and not loss aversion per se. 
In contrast, converging evidence has been found for a possible neurohormonal 
mechanism underlying the amygdala’s role in loss aversion. Studies in rodents have found 
that the amygdala influences striatally mediated actions to avoid aversive stimuli via a 
noradrenergic pathway (McGaugh, 2002). Loss aversion might rely upon a similar 
amygdala-striatal noradrenergic circuit in humans. Supporting this hypothesis, PET assays 
of noradrenergic activity have found that individuals with lower noradrenergic transporter 
density (presumably leading to greater noradrenergic transmission) are more loss averse 
(Takahashi et al, 2013), and that the noradrenergic receptor antagonist propranolol 
selectively reduces loss aversion but leaves risk attitudes unaffected (Sokol-Hessner et al, 
2015), in contrast to the effects of the dopamine precursor levodopa. Finally, in contrast to 
the parallel decline of the dopamine system and reward seeking over the lifespan 
discussed above, the noradrenergic system is more stable over the lifespan (Moll et al., 
2000), potentially explaining why loss aversion does not change substantially with age.  
Together, these findings suggest a novel model for the neural mechanisms 
underlying loss aversion (see Box 1), in which the striatum receives dopaminergic inputs 
that reflect the subjective value of potential rewards and the amygdala modulates the 
striatum via a noradrenergic pathway sensitive to potential losses. This model of loss 
aversion is consistent with proposals that an amygdala-striatal modulatory circuit 
dependent on noradrenergic signaling contributes to a variety of flexible behaviors 
(LeDoux & Gorman, 2001; Phelps, Lempert, & Sokol-Hessner, 2014). On the basis of this 
model, we predict that while manipulations of the dopaminergic system will modulate risky 
decision-making in contexts with potential gains but not losses, these manipulations will 
have little effect in the presence of potential losses due to modulation of the striatum by 
amygdala inputs. In contrast, boosting noradrenergic activity will increase the tendency to 
avoid losses in decisions that feature both potential gains and losses.  
 
Box 1: 
 
 
CHALLENGES TO LOSS AVERSION 
Loss aversion has been subject to challenges in recent years from research that 
emphasizes context dependence. These studies have found consistent shifts in decision-
making as a function of recent history (Jeuchems, Balaguer, Ruz, & Summerfield, 2017; 
Post, van den Assem, Baltussen, & Thaler, 2008; Rigoli et al., 2016) or current context 
(Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013; Yamada, Louie, Tymula, & Glimcher, 2018) explained by 
biologically plausible normalization models that consider values relative to their context. 
Given our growing understanding of the importance of context in decision-making, it is 
unsurprising that loss aversion varies across environments (Ert & Erev, 2013; Mukherjee, 
Sahay, Pammi, & Srinivasan, 2017; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), although there is no 
model yet that explicitly integrates contextually sensitive normalization computations with 
the gain/loss asymmetries that explain loss aversion. 
However, even in a context in which loss aversion is not present at the group level, 
we would still expect individuals to exhibit degrees of loss aversion that are meaningfully 
above and below the group average. These stable individual differences should persist 
across different contexts due to consistency in the underlying affective and neural 
processes. We contend that recent studies challenging the extent of loss aversion present 
in different environments do not invalidate its usefulness. Our framework highlights the 
value of using computational models to capture stable individual differences, regardless of 
group-level averages, in predicting the choices people make and in relating these 
differences to well-being. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Prospect Theory has dominated the field of decision-making for nearly four decades 
precisely because of its explanatory power. Though Prospect Theory consists of multiple 
components (including probability weighting, a reference point, and risk attitudes), loss 
aversion is arguably the most famous piece of the theory, and a central reason for its 
continued remarkable dominance and its wide range of influences on science, business, 
medicine, and policy.  
The sources of individual variability in loss aversion remain under investigation. The 
question of who is loss averse and by how much has critical implications especially in 
psychiatric contexts. Although anxiety disorder affects risk but not loss aversion 
(Charpentier, Aylward, et al., 2016), one possible theory of depression is that negative 
events are overweighted relative to positive events during decision-making, leading an 
individual to perceive all possible actions as leading to, on average, poor outcomes. 
Another clinical context in which loss aversion may have particular importance could be 
hoarding, in which individuals are unable to dispose of goods, a behavior that could be 
explained by an excessive degree of loss aversion. When considering the possible roles of 
loss aversion in psychiatric disorders, the specific stimuli (e.g., monetary vs. social 
outcomes) may be important as gain-loss asymmetries may have unique characteristics in 
different domains and these asymmetries may also vary with context. More broadly, the 
pervasive nature of loss aversion combined with its variability suggests that loss aversion 
may be of wide and profound relevance in understanding the choices that people make. 
The psychological and neurobiological framework that we propose for 
understanding loss aversion reflects a number of recent advances in computational and 
affective neuroscience. Our model makes novel predictions for the emotional 
consequences of loss aversion and the situations in which neuromodulatory manipulations 
will affect choices. We predict that the asymmetric affective consequences of loss aversion 
will rapidly diminish with time, and that manipulations of the dopaminergic system will alter 
risk seeking but not loss aversion, in contrast to manipulations of the noradrenergic 
system, which will alter loss aversion. However, there remain many unanswered 
questions. In this light, continued refinement of psychological and neural models of loss 
aversion and decision-making will have broad benefits for the science of decision-making, 
and society more generally not only due to continuing economic relevance but also due to 
its importance for well-being in healthy and psychiatric populations. 
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1. Ert & Erev (2013) Judgment and Decision Making – Six experiments highlight 
specific situations that increase or decrease loss averse behavior, with the authors 
ultimately questioning the validity of the concept of loss aversion in the face of 
manipulations that easily alter its extent.   
2. Phelps, Lempert, and Sokol-Hessner (2014) Annual Review of Neuroscience – This 
thorough review details the neuroscientific bases of various interactions between 
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3. Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan (2015) Journal of Neuroscience – Explains 
the effect of pharmacologically boosting dopamine on decision-making under 
uncertainty as increasing reward seeking without affecting loss aversion.  
4. Sokol-Hessner, Hsu, Curley, Delgado, Camerer, and Phelps (2009) PNAS – Links 
loss aversion to physiological arousal responses to gain and loss outcomes, and 
shows that emotion regulation strategies can reduce both loss aversion and arousal 
responses to loss outcomes.  
